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Interlocking tables are the functional specification defining the routes on which the passage of the
train is allowed. Associated with the route, the states and actions of all related signalling equipment
are also specified. It is well-known that designing and verifying the interlocking tables are labour
intensive, tedious and prone to errors. To assist the verification process and detect errors rapidly,
we formally model and analyse the interlocking tables using Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs). Although
a large interlocking table can be easily modelled, analysing the model is rather difficult due to the
state explosion problem and undesired safe deadlocks. The safe deadlocks are when no train collides
but the train traffic cannot proceed any further. For ease of analysis we incorporate automatic route
setting and automatic route cancelling functions into the model. These help reducing the number
of the deadlocks. We also exploit the new features of CPN Tools; prioritized transitions; inhibitor
arcs; and reset arcs. These help reducing the size of the state spaces. We also include a fail safe
specification called flank protection into the interlocking model.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In the railway signaling domain, an interlocking table is a tabular representation comprising the sections
or routes that the train is allowed to enter together with the required states and actions of all related
equipment along the routes. The interlocking tables play such an important role that operating procedures
and train movement must be complied with it. This document also acts as a legal agreement between the
railway administrators and the contractors. Railway signalling contractors usually have software tools
generating the interlocking table from the track layout and track side equipments. However the generated
table is not unique. It depends upon the signalling principle or regulation of each railway administrator.
After the interlocking tables are designed and checked by the contractors, they need to be rechecked
by signal engineers. In the past we manually inspected the submitted interlocking tables without any
software tools. Thus the checking process was very slow, labour intensive and prone to errors. To reduce
the manpower and time consumed in the checking process we have introduced the State Railway of
Thailand to the formal methods and CPN Tools since 2009.
1.2 Motivation
Previously, we modelled and analysed in [11] a single track railway station using Coloured Petri Nets
(CPNs). We created a static model where CPN structure was used to mimic the signalling layout and the
∗Supported by National Research Council of Thailand Grant no. PorKor/2551-153.
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train movements. A generic CPN model of the signal operation was also developed. The content of the
interlocking table coded into ML functions which are used on arc inscriptions. Modelling interlocking
tables of other railway stations was simply done by changing the content of the ML functions. These
ML functions were automatically generated. After the contractors submitted the interlocking table files
in Microsoft-EXCEL format, the tables were transformed to XML and then to ML functions using Ex-
tensible Stylesheet Language Transformations (XSLT). The interlocking tables were formally verified by
exhaustively searching for the states where trains collide. [11] had two important problems. Firstly, when
we had many signalling devices working together, the CPN diagram became too complicated. It took
2-3 days to create a new CPN model of the signalling layout for a large station. Secondly, [11] focused
on only interlocking tables. Although the system was safe, the signalman could give the sequences of
instructions (route setting) that leaded the train traffic into deadlocks. Using state space generation, our
CPN model generated a lot of safe terminal markings that had no train collision but the train traffic was
in deadlock. It was very inconvenient to investigate all terminal markings in [11].
To solve the first problem, we modeled in [12] the signalling layout by encoding the geographic
information into tokens with a complex data structure. When signaling layout was modified or rebuilt, we
simply change the initial marking. To solve the second problem, this paper introduces the automatic route
setting and automatic route canceling functions into the CPN model. Although these two procedures are
not specified in the interlocking tables, both are standard operating procedures normally conducted by
signalmen. After applying these two procedures, the sequences of route setting commands that lead to
traffic deadlocks could be avoided.
1.3 Contributions
The contribution of this paper is three fold. Firstly, to ease of analysis and get rid of the undesired,
safe terminal markings, the automatic route setting and automatic route canceling functions are included
into the model. Secondly, when we analysed the double track station in [12], we encountered the state
explosion. To alleviate the state explosion problem, we revise the CPN model by exploiting the recently
introduced features of CPN Tools version 4.0.0 [13] that are prioritized transitions; inhibitor arcs; and
reset arcs. Thirdly, designing a large interlocking table is a difficult task partly because the railway
signalling system is required to be fail safe. The fail safe means that, in the event of failure, the system
shall respond in a no harmful way or no danger to persons. In the railway signalling domain an important
event of failure is when a train overruns the stop signal. Preventing an accident when a train overruns
the stop signal, a fail safe condition called “Flank Protection” is required. This condition has not been
included in [11] and [12] because it does not affect the normal functional behaviour as long as no fault
occurs in the braking system and the train driver still obeys the signal. However this paper has included
the flank protection into the model.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the concept of railway
signalling system and interlocking tables. Section 3 reviews related work. The CPN model is discussed
in Section 4. Analysis results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 presents conclusion and outlines
suggested future work.
2 Railway Signalling Systems and Interlocking Tables
2.1 Signalling Systems
In general the railway lines are divided into sections. To avoid collision, only one train is allowed in one
section at a time. The train can enter or leave the section when the driver receives authorization from
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Figure 1: Signalling layout of the Panthong Station (double track)
a signalman via a signal indicator. Before the signalman issues the authorization, he needs to ensure
that no object blocks the passage of the train. The section between two railway stations, which involves
two signal men, is called “block section”. To prevent human error that may lead to collisions, the strict
operation on a block section is controlled by equipment called “Block Instruments”. Figure 1 shows the
signalling layout of a double track station named “Panthong”. The signalling layout comprises a col-
lection of railway tracks and signalling equipment such as track circuits, points and signals. (e.g. signal
no.1-3 and signal no.2-4). Each piece of signalling equipment has an identification number and holds a
certain state as follows.
Track Circuits A track circuit is an electrical device used to detect the presence of a train. A track
circuit (e.g. 61T, 1-3T) is either clear indicating no train on the track or occupied indicating the possible1
presence of a train.
Warner signals A warner signal (e.g. 1-1, 2-2, 3-1,4-2) has two aspects: yellow or green. It informs
drivers about the status of the next signal.
Home signals A home signal (e.g. 1-3, 2-4, 3-3, 4-4) has three aspects: red, yellow or green. It
displays red when the train is forbidden to enter the station area. It displays yellow giving the driver
authority to move the train into the station area and prepare to stop at the next signal. It displays green
giving the driver authority to move the train passing the station and enter the next block section.
Starter signals A starter (e.g. 15, 16, 17, 18, 31, 32) has two aspects: red or green. It displays red
when forbidding the train to enter the block section. It displays green when giving the driver authority to
move the train into the block section.
Point A point (e.g. 101A, 101B, 111, 112, 102A, 102B) or railway switch or turnout is a mechanical
installation used to guide a train from one track to another. A point usually has a straight through track
called “main-line” and a diverging track called loop line. A point is right-hand when a moving train from
a joint track diverges to the right of the straight track. Similarly a left-hand point has the diverging track
on the opposite side of a right-hand point. When a point diverges the train, it is in reverse position. When
a point lets the train move straight through, it is in normal position.
Derailer A derailer (e.g. 201, 202) is a mechanical installation used to prevent unauthorized move-
ments of trains or unattended rolling stock. The train is derailed when it rolls over the derailer. The
normal position is the derailing position.
2.2 Interlocking Tables
A collection of track circuits along the reserved section is called “route”. An entry signal shall be clear
to let the train enter the route. Although the request to clear the entry signal is issued by the signalman,
1When the track circuit fails, its state is occupied even if there is no train.
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the route entry permission is decided by the interlocking system using safety rules and control methods
specified in the agreed Interlocking Tables. Tables 1, 2, and 3 are the Interlocking Tables (partial) for
Panthong station of which the signalling layout is shown in Fig. 1. Data in the first column, “From”,
is the route identifications which are labelled by the entry signal: 1-3(1); 1-3(2); 3-3(1); 3-3(2); 3-3(3);
2-4(1); 2-4(2); 4-4(1); 4-4(2); 4-4(3); 15(1); 15(2); 16(1); 16(2); 31(1);31(2); 32(1);32(2); 17 and 18.
Due to space limitation we show only 4 routes in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Each row in the tables represents the
requirement how to set and release each route. For example, route 3-3(3) comprises the track circuits 3-
3T, 3-71AT, 3-71BT,3-71CT,101AT, 18T, 63T, 17T and requires that the point 101 is in normal position.
Routes 3-3(1), 3-3(2) and 3-3(3) distinguish that behind signal 3-3 three routes are possible. Similar rule
applies to routes 1-3; 2-4; and 4-4. The column “Requires Route Normal” shows conflict routes. A route
cannot be set if any conflicting routes have been set and not yet released. For route 3-3(3) the conflicting
routes are 16(2), 32(2), 3-3(1), 3-3(2), 18, and 4-4(3). The exit (starter) signal of this route is 17, and if
home signal 3-3 shows green, then starter signal 17 shows green.
Different Interlocking systems from different manufacturers may have different control methods.
However there are four basic control methods widely accepted and used among railway companies.
Route locking Route setting involves a collection of adjacent track circuits, points and signals. A
route can be set and reserved for a passage of a train along this route. To assure the safety, firstly, the
interlocking system verifies that the route does not conflict with other routes previously set. Secondly,
the points along the route are locked in the correct positions. If the related points are not in the correct
positions, the controller will attempt to set and lock them in the correct positions. Thirdly, the track
circuits along the required route are all clear or unoccupied so that nothing obstructs the passage of the
train. Then the entry signal can be cleared (showing yellow or green).
Approach locking After a route is set; the point is locked; and the entry signal is cleared, if the track
circuit in front of (approaching) the entry signal is occupied, then the signalman cannot cancel the route
and the entry signal by the normal procedure. Approach locking prevents the train driver from the sudden
change of signal aspect from green or yellow to red. Column 3 in Table 2, “APPROACH LOCKED
WHEN SIGNAL CLEARED & TC OCC”, presents locking when a route is set and the approach track
circuit is occupied. For example, route 3-3(3) will be approach locked if the route is set and track 3-1T
is occupied.
Route released After the passage of the train, the reserved route is released automatically. Column
“Route Released by” in Table 2 presents route released mechanism for the signalling layout in Fig. 1.
Route 3-3(3) will be released when the track circuits 3-3T, 3-71AT, 3-71BT, 3-71CT, 101AT are clear;
the track circuit 18T is occupied and then clear; and the track circuit 63T is occupied. The reserved route
Table 1: An Interlocking Table for Panthong station (part 1:Route locking)
3-3(2) , 3-3(3), 18 , 1-3(1) , 1-3(2) ,  3-71CT, 101AT, 101BT,
3-3(1) ,3-3(3) ,18 ,1-3(1),1-3(2) , 3-71CT,  101AT, 101BT, 
17 Y
31(1),31(2), 15(1) , 2-4(1), 2-4(2) , 
112 102
SECTION 4
4-4T, 4-2BT,4-2AT,943-3TBLOCK
G
4-4(1) , 4-4(2),4-4(3)
DOWN15(2) 17T, 102BT, 4-72BT,4-72AT,
3-71CT, 101AT, 18T,63T,17TG
3-3T, 3-71AT, 3-71BT, 3-3(3) 17 AT R# 16(2) , 32(2) , 3-3(1) , 3-3(2) ,
111T, 62T, 112T2-4(1), 2-4(2) , 4-4(1) , 4-4(2)
3-3(2) 15 Y 15 AT R# 16(1) ,16(2) ,32(1) ,32(2),
3-3(1) 31
17 AT G#  18 ,4-4(3)
101
16(1) , 16(2) ,32(1) , 32(2) , 
 2-4(1) , 2-4(2), 4-4(1) , 4-4(2)
111,112
Y  3-3T, 3-71AT, 3-71BT ,
111T, 61T, 112T
 3-3T,3-71AT, 3-71BT,
SET & LOCKS POINTS
NORMAL
CLEAR
31 AT R# 
101
ASPECT SIGNAL AHEAD
ROUTE
INTERLOCKING CONTROLS
REQUIRES TC
REVERSE
REQUIRES
201, 202
101,111,112,
TOFROM ROUTE NORMAL
S. Vanit-Anunchai 21
Table 2: An Interlocking Table for Panthong station (part 2:Approach locking)
ROUTE
WHEN SIGNAL CLEARED &
AND
 RELEASE
3-3(1) 3-1T
3-3(2) 3-1T
3-3(3) 3-1T
15(2) 63T
3-71BT, 3-71CT
DOWN BLOCK 3
NOT SET
120 sec
 TIME
4-4T
SECTION 4
4-2BT4-72BT,4-72AT,BLOCK
DOWN 63T,17T, 102BT, 240 sec DOWN BLOCK4
DOWN BLOCK 3
3-71CT,101AT
63T 240 sec120 sec 3-3T,3-71AT ,3-71BT, 18T17
NOT SET
101AT, 101BT
DOWN BLOCK 362T 240 sec120 sec
NOT SET
101AT, 101BT
3-3T,3-71AT , 111T
3-71BT, 3-71CT
3-3T,3-71AT , 111T 61T
15
120 sec
31
SET
CONTROL
Notes
REMARKS
AND / OR
AFTER
240 sec
ROUTE RELEASED BY
TC
& CLEAR
Emergency
OR
CLEARFrom TO
APPROACH LOCKED
OR
TC OCC
TC OCC
TC OCC
Table 3: An Interlocking Table for Panthong station (part 3:Flank Protection)
                   ROUTE
    SET & LOCKS POINTS
    REVERSE
3-3(1) 31 102
3-3(2) 15 102
201, 202
3-3(3) 102
15(2) 202
SECTION 4
BLOCK
DOWN
17
CONTROLS
REQUIRE TRACK
INTERLOCKING
 AT TIME OF CLEARING ONLY
From TO NORMAL TC CLEAR
62T
63T
can be emergency released but the release action will be delayed for 4 minutes after the signalman issues
the “emergency route released” command.
Flank protection This is an important class of fail safe requirement. The equipment within the
surrounding area of the reserved route that may cause an accident shall be protected even if no train
is expected to pass such a signal or such points. Points should be in such positions that they do not
give immediate access to the route. Even though those flank points and derailers are not located on
the required route, when the route is set, they shall be locked in the safe position until the route is
released. Table 3 shows the flank protection requirements for routes 3-3(1), 3-3(2), 3-3(3) and 15(2)
of the Panthong’s interlocking table. For example route 3-3(3) requires the points 102 (both 102A and
102B), which are not on the route, be locked in the normal position. Route 15(2) requires the track
circuits 63T, which is not in the route 15(2), be unoccupied. Route 15(2) also requires the derailer 202,
which is not in the route 15(2), be locked in the derail position. Because routes 3-3(3) and 15(2) are not
in conflict, trains may enter these two routes at the same time. However arriving on 63T, the train on
route 3-3(3) could overrun the red signal no. 17 and collide with the train on route 15(2) at point 102. To
prevent this accident, route 3-3(3) requires flank protection, point 102 be locked in the normal position.
Meanwhile Route 15(2) cannot be set while point 102 in the normal position.
3 Related Work
In [6], Fokkink and Hollingshead divide the railway signalling system into three layers: infrastructure,
interlocking and logistics layers. The infrastructure layer involves objects or equipment used in the yard.
The work in this category, for instance [1,4], ties closely with the manufacturer’s products. The logistics
layer involves human operation and train scheduling which aims at efficiency and absence of deadlocks.
It involves the operation of the whole railway network (e.g. [7,9]) thus the state space explosion problem
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is often encountered. The interlocking layer provides the interface between logistics and infrastructure
layers. It prevents us from accidents caused by human errors or equipment failure. The work in this
category models the interlocking tables and verifies them against the signalling principles. For exam-
ple [6, 15] uses theorem prover and [16] uses NuSMV. Hansen [8] presented a VDM model of a railway
interlocking system, and validate it through simulation using Meta Language (ML). The work focuses
on the principles and concepts of Danish systems rather than a particular interlocking system. He also
pointed out that Interlocking systems from other countries may be different from the Interlocking de-
scribed in [8]. Winter et al [14] proposed to create two formal models during the design process of
interlockings. One is the formal model of the Signalling Principles called Principle model. The other is
the formal model of the functional specification for a specific track-layout called Interlocking model. The
Control Tables are translated into an interlocking model and then checked against the Principle model.
At first she used CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) as a modelling language but later found
that the CSP models of the interlocking system and the signalling principle are difficult to understand and
validate. Thus [16] used ASM (Abstract State Machine) notation to model the semantics of control ta-
bles. The ASM model is then automatically transformed to NuSMV code [5] while the safety properties
are modeled in CTL (Computational Tree Logic). Basten [2] simulated and analysed railway interlock-
ing specification using ExSpect which is a software tool based on high level Petri Nets. However formal
verification of railway interlockings were not possible because they were too complex for the technology
at that time. Hagalisletto et al [7] modelled signalling equipment such as track circuits and turnouts using
Coloured Petri Nets. But their aim is to simulate the train schedule rather than to verify the interlocking.
4 The CPN Model of the Panthong’s Interlocking Table
Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) [10] are a graphical modelling language for design, verification and analysis
of distributed, concurrent and complex systems. CPNs include hierarchical constructs that allow modular
specifications to be created. CPN Tools [10] is a software tool used to create, maintain, simulate and
analyse CPNs. We use CPN Tools version 4 [13] to create our railway signaling model and analyse them
using reachabilty analysis.
4.1 Modelling Scope and Assumptions
To reduce the complexity of the model as well as avoid the state explosion problem when analysing
railway networks [7, 16], we need to make the following assumptions regarding train movement and
signalling operations:
1. We assume that a train has no length and it occupies one track at a time. The train moves in only
one direction. Train shunting is not considered.
2. Our model does not include the auxiliary signals such as Call-on, Shunting and Junction indicators.
3. Our model does not include level crossings.
4. Our model includes high level abstraction of block systems but we do not model their operations
in detail.
5. Our model does not include timers.
6. The train must not move through a track circuit so fast that the interlocking cannot detect the
presence of the train. We use prioritized transitions to model this condition.
7. Unlike [12], our CPN model includes the flank protection.
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4.2 Examples of the CPN Model
This section provides two examples of CPN pages. Due to space limitation we choose to explain only the
UserCommand and Move Track to Track pages because these pages play central roles in the model.
For global declarations and other details regarding our CPN model of the interlocking table, see [11]
and [12].
4.2.1 UserCommand page
The UserCommand page shown in Fig. 2 models the action after a route request command is issued (e.g.
3-3(3)). Transition SetRoute checks whether it is plausible to set the requested route. Taking tokens
from fusion places RouteNormal and TrackPool, transition SetRoute checks if
1. No conflict route is being set (modelled by function require route normal).
2. The relevant tracks are unoccupied (modelled by functions require track clear and
require flank track clear).
If all conditions are met, transitions SetNormalLock and SetReverseLock will attempt to set and
lock points in the correct position. The two conditions and the states of the relevant point machines and
derailers will be rechecked again by Substitution transition RouteSetting.
Actually the above model description is enough to satisfy the specification requirement. However
when the CPN model was analysed, we found many deadlocks which were safe terminal states. It is
inconvenient to investigate all deadlocks so we attempt to reduce them by introducing automatic route
setting and automatic route canceling. These two functions are not specified in the interlocking table
because they are normally conducted by the signal man. The automatic route setting condition is that
the preselected route setting command can be issued only when the track in front of the entry signal is
occupied. This is modelled by the ML function approach set. After the transition SetRoute fires, it
SetPoint
ReverseLock
INT
SetPoint
NormalLock
INT
RouteSuccess?
ROUTE
SetRoute
Command
In/Out
ROUTE
TrackPool
Fusion 2
TRACK
InitTrack
POINT_POOL
Fusion 3
POINT
InitPoint
RouteNormalFusion 6
ROUTE
InitRoute
RouteSetting
SetRoute
SetRoute
P_HIGH8
SetReverseLock
[p_id = Int.toString(i) 
andalso 
From = (Int.toString(i)^"T")]
P_SetPointR
SetNormalLock
[p_id = Int.toString(i) 
andalso 
From = (Int.toString(i)^"T")]
P_SetPointN
CancelRouteSetting
P_LOWEST
1`(route)
1`route
1`{pid=p_id,  
pos = pos1, lock = false}
1`{pid=p_id, 
pos = Reverse,lock = true}
1`{pid=p_id, 
pos = Normal, lock = true}
1`{pid=p_id, 
pos = pos1,  lock = false}
ii
require_track_clear(route) ++
require_flank_track_clear(route)++
list_to_ms(approach_set(route))
require_route_normal(route) require_route_normal(route)
--1`route
1`(route)
list_to_ms(rpoint_reverse(route) ^^
                  r_flank_point_reverse(route))
list_to_ms(rpoint_normal(route)^^
                 r_flank_point_normal(route))
1`(route)
1`(route)
unlock_point_normal(route)
++unlock_point_reverse(route)
++unlock_flank_point_normal(route)
++unlock_flank_point_reverse(route)
require_point_normal(route)
++require_point_reverse(route)
++require_flank_point_normal(route)
++require_flank_point_reverse(route)
1`{tid=From, pos= noTrain} 1`{tid=From, pos= noTrain}
Figure 2: CPN model: UserCommand page
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will be disabled by the inhibitor arc from place RouteSuccess?. When the route setting process is not
complete, no other route can be set. Transitions SetNormalLock and SetReverseLock attempt to set
and lock the points in the position specified in the interlocking table. Because transition SetNormalLock
has a higher priority, the actions of transition SetNormalLock do not interleave with the actions of
transition SetReverseLock.
When the route setting cannot be completed and no more action can occur in the model, the in-
complete route setting will be canceled using transition CancelRouteSetting (lowest priority). This
transition clears all tokens in the places SetPointReverseLock and SetPointNormalLock by the re-
set arcs (two arrow arcs) in a single instance. Using prioritized transitions, inhibitor arcs and reset arcs
can alleviate the state explosion problem. The automatic route setting and automatic route cancelation
can eliminate deadlocks due to the wrong sequence of route setting commands given by the signal man.
4.2.2 Move Track to Track page
Figure 3 shows the CPN diagram modelling the simple train movements between two adjacent tracks.
Place Config stores tokens representing signalling layout as discussed in [12]. In addition to the layout,
the train movement requires information regarding the status of signalling equipment stored in places
TrackPools, SignalPool, and PointPool1. Transition MoveT2T represents the movement across
adjacent straight tracks. Transition MoveTST behaves similar to Transition MoveT2T but there is an entry
Figure 3: CPN model: Move Track to Track page
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signal post between the adjacent tracks. However the train moves toward the back of the signal. The
train movement facing the front of the entry signal was modelled in another CPN page illustrated in [12].
The movement across points is captured by Transition MoveTPT. For ease of analysis we also add two
places AccidentH2T H2H and AccidentHead2Side for detecting train collision.
5 Analysis
5.1 Desired Property
A basic safety property that railway signalling shall provide is to prevent train collision and derailment.
Places AccidentH2T H2H and AccidentHead2Side shall be empty when no collision occurs. Checking
derailment is in other CPN pages that we do not discussed in this paper. To convince us of the correctness
of our CPN model and the interlocking table, the CPN model is analysed using reachability analysis in
CPN Tools version 4.0.0. The investigation of the generated reachability graph is conducted on Windows
XP using a AMD9650 computer with 2.30 GHz and 3.5 GB of RAM. After generating each entire graph,
we use ML query functions searching for the markings that have tokens in places2 AccidentH2T H2H or
AccidentHead2Side. For ease of investigating the terminal markings, we attempt to execute the model
until there is no train in the model. This can be done using automatic route setting and automatic route
cancelation. However there are still possible deadlocks left as shown in Section 5.3.
5.2 Initial Configurations
Despite the fact that we can analyse various scenarios by changing the initial markings, due to space
limitation, we select to discuss only six cases with the initial configurations shown in Table 4. The initial
configurations are:
1. Case A is when three trains are on the platform tracks.
2. Case B is when two trains are on the platform tracks 62T and 63T.
3. Case C1,C2, and C3 are when one train is on the platform track 61T, 62T, and 63T respectively.
4. Case D is when no train is on the platform tracks.
In all initial markings, four trains are coming from the north and south directions and other track
circuits are unoccupied; all points are in Normal position and unlocked; all derailers are Normal and
locked. All signals are in normal states.
2Of course we also need to check other accident places in other CPN pages that are not discussed in this paper.
Table 4: Initial configurations of track circuits.
Case 886Ͳ1T 886Ͳ3T 61T 62T 63T 943Ͳ1T 943Ͳ3T
A TrainUP TrainUP TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
B TrainUP TrainUP NoTrain TrainDown TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
C1 TrainUP TrainUP TrainUP noTrain noTrain TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
C2 TrainUP TrainUP noTrain TrainUP noTrain TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
C3 TrainUP TrainUP noTrain noTrain TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
D TrainUP TrainUP noTrain noTrain noTrain TrainDOWN TrainDOWN

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5.3 Analysis Results
Tables 5 and 6 show analysis results: state space sizes; execution time; and the number of deadlocks. All
markings are safe (no train collision). In particular, Tables 5 illustrates that our approach can reduce the
state space sizes.
1. B[Coor2010] was the old analysis result of Case B (from [12]).
2. B[no Flank Protection] is a new result of Case B when the CPN model is revised not only using
prioritized transitions; inhibitor arcs; reset arcs but also including the automatic route setting and
automatic route canceling functions. However the model has not included the flank protection.
This result shows that our proposed reduces the number of states to about 70%. The number of
terminal markings is also reduced significantly.
3. B[with Flank Protect] is the result of Case B when we add the flank protection into the model.
Because of this restriction, the non-conflicting routes in [12] that has no overlapped section now
become conflicted so that the state space size is reduced drastically .
Revising model structure with the flank protection requirement, we are able to analyse the scenarios
that we cannot reach before (Case C1, C2, C3 and D). The details of the terminal markings are listed in
Table 7. They show the occupancies of trains on the tracks in front of the entry signal. In all terminal
markings other tracks are unoccupied. All signals are in the normal states. Terminal markings no. 5 of
Case C1 and no. 7 of Case D suggest that the signal man can manage the traffic such that no deadlock
occurs. For the traffic of Case C2 and C3 there always be deadlocks so that the emergency procedure
shall be carefully conducted to solve the deadlocks.
Table 5: Comparison of the state space sizes (with [12]).
Case Node Arc Time(hh:mm:ss) No.ofTerminal
Markings
A[Coor2010] 36 84 00:01:01 1
A[noFlankProtection] 16 32 00:00:11 1
A[withFlankProtection] 16 32 00:00:11 1
B[Coor2010] 261,522 1,189,280 11:28:44 57
B[noFlankProtection] 187,016 288,549 09:49:01 3
B[withFlankProtection] 16 32 00:00:12 1

Table 6: Summary of state space results.
Case Nodes Arc Time (hh:mm:ss) No. of Deadlocks 
C1 24,133 45,704 00:55:03 5
C2 196 348 00:01:11 2
C3 2,004 4,788 00:05:35 3
D 76,257 137,398 04:07:27 7
6 Conclusion and Suggested Work
This paper restructures the previous CPN model in [12] to make the analysis process easier and alleviate
the state explosion problem. Our study shows that adding the automatic route setting and automatic
route canceling functions into the CPN model reduces the number of undesired deadlocks. These two
functions are not specified in the interlocking table but they are normally conducted by the signalmen.
Our study also shows that using prioritized transitions, inhibitor arcs and reset arcs can reduce the state
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Table 7: Terminal Markings.
Case No. 1-1T 3-1T 61T 62T 63T 4-2BT 2-2BT
C1 1 noTrain noTrain TrainUP TrainUP TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
2 TrainUP TrainUP TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainDOWN noTrain noTrain
3 noTrain TrainUP TrainUP TrainUP TrainDOWN noTrain TrainDOWN
4 TrainUP noTrain TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainUP TrainDOWN noTrain
5 noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain
C2 1 TrainUP TrainUP noTrain TrainUP TrainDOWN noTrain TrainDOWN
2 TrainUP noTrain noTrain TrainUP TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
C3 1 noTrain TrainUP noTrain noTrain TrainUP TrainDOWN noTrain
2 noTrain TrainUP noTrain TrainUP TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
3 TrainUP TrainUP noTrain TrainDOWN TrainUP TrainDOWN noTrain
D 1 TrainUP noTrain noTrain TrainDOWN TrainUP TrainDOWN noTrain
2 noTrain TrainUP noTrain TrainUP TrainDOWN noTrain TrainDOWN
3 noTrain noTrain noTrain TrainUP TrainUP TrainDOWN TrainDOWN
4 TrainUP TrainUP noTrain TrainDOWN TrainDOWN noTrain noTrain
5 noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain TrainUP TrainDOWN noTrain
6 noTrain TrainUP noTrain noTrain TrainDOWN noTrain noTrain
7 noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain noTrain
space sizes. Although the flank protection significantly reduces the state space size, we discover that it
masks out errors in the route locking part of the interlocking table (Table 1). It seems inevitable that
the verification of the interlocking table without the flank protection shall be conducted before the flank
protection functions are verified.
From a modelling perspective it is easy to add the flank protection requirement but from analysis
perspective it is not so easy to be verified. The flank protection is a fail safe requirement preventing an
accident when equipment fails or a train passes a signal at danger. This dangerous scenario normally
cannot be reached in our regular CPN model. To verify the flank protection and reach the states that
are normally unreachable, the CPN model needs to allow the train pass a signal at danger. Thus, we
suggest to conduct experiments by deleting the signal from the signalling layout and let the train pass
over. This can be easily done by modify the configuration tokens that represent geographic information.
This modified CPN models are used to generate the reachability graphs. When we search the entire
graphs, we expect no train collision. However, if those points are not related to the required route at all,
accidents definitely do not occur regardless of the point positions either normal or reverse. Thus, to prove
the safety properties of the flank protection requirement we need to prove two properties. Firstly, if the
flank protection works correctly, no train collision occurs. Secondly, if the CPN model does not include
the flank protection, trains will collide.
When verifying the flank protection in the interlocking table, we always assume that the flank points
are known. However, for a large and complex station layout, it is difficult to identify the flank points
without any errors. To facilitate the design and verification tasks, we suggest to use the modified CPN
model generating train collision scenarios. Tracing the markings before trains collide should help us
identify the flank points and their correct positions.
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